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Introduction
　It becomes an urgent necessity for us to make clear the historically-conditioned particularity
of the construction of socialism in the USSR rather than its general significance in the field
of studying socialist economy. For, in the first place, when most people in Japan think of
socialism in general, they judge it　not from　the theory but from the concrete realities of
socialist countries, especially the USSR which is the first socialist country in history and ａ
neighbouring power. Secondly, as the negative phenomena in the USSR are being revealed
more and more recently, the tendencies to negatively evaluate the idea of scientific socialism
itself are growing in Japan｡
　０ｎ the other hand, in Japan most of the researchers on socialist economy have been devot-
ing　themselves　to studying　abstract　and　theoretical problems　such　as systematization of
political economy of socialism, commodity production in socialist economy, socialist ownership
and so on, or　to analyzing　the present　situations of　the　socialist　countries economically,
ignoring non (or anti)-socialistic factors which　are still　existing in these countries, on the
assumption that these countries are already completed socialist societies. Consequently, their
researches have not responded positively about the incredulity of socialism which have been
cherished by most people. Therefore, it is necessary to make thoroughly clear the historically-
conditioned particularity of the construction of socialism in the USSR, in order　to　revive
the idea of scientific socialism｡
　It is proper to focus our attention upon the construction of socialism during the first five-
year plan (1928-1932). In the author's opinion, there were various historical possibilities
of development for Soviet Russia after the October Revolution. Therefore,“the road of sub-
sequent development of Soviet state was by no means predetermined to be necessarily trans-
formed into Stalinist regime."D　Historically speaking, between the October Revolution and
the contemporary Soviet socialism there seems to be ａ sort of refraction or contortion which
does not allow us to connect the former to the latter directly. The period of the first five-
year plan was one of the most important turning points in Soviet history.
n. The Eve of the First Five-Year Plan
　The leadership　of　the　Bolsheviki were confronted with a serious crisis.　That was the
grain procurement crisis which started from　the beginning of year 1928.　The grain pro-
curement crisis was not merely an economic affair, but　also ａ politically significant affair
that threatened to shake the regime. With this crisis and the extraordinary measure for a
background, a conflict began to be actualized between the Bukharin group and the Stalin
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group, who had made ａ common cause　with each other against t!ne Trotskist consistently
until then. 2'　Bukharin found out the main cause of the　crisis in “the essentially erroneous
price policy”. Bukharin, who was the strong protector of the interests of the peasantry and
stillbelieved in the effectiveness of NEP (New Economic Policy), demanded to stop the ex-
traordinary measures immediately and to raise the grain price in favour of the peasantry.
０ｎ the contrary, Stalin found out the main cause of the crisis in kulaks (rich peasants) who
have grown up to gain control 0f the grain market, and was gradually coming round to ａ
line to build socialistic strongpoints such as kolkhozy and sovkhozy in the village.
　The time from 1928 t0 1929 was the important period when ａ severe intra-party struggle
was unfolded between Stalin who was turning to the left and Bukharin who tried to preserve
the framework of NEP for his life. The left, such as Preobrazhensky and so on, saw in
Stalin゛Sleft turn the victory of their own views. Being deprived of their leader Trotsky一一
who was expelled from the Party and was exciled to Alma-Ata in November 1927 and to
overseas in the beginning of the year 1929一一, they expected ａ reconciliation with Stalin.
And they rallied to Stalin to save the revolution from “the dreadful rightists”.3）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ⅢBukharin's Counterprogramm
　Many ideas which Bukharin expressed in the process of the struggleagainst Stalinincluded
noteworthy contents in the light of the present, although they were not adopted in practice.
They were expressed in　a series of　his essays and speeches at that time, and took, as it
were, a character of“counterprogramm”(M. Lewin) as against Stalin'scourse. Let us
introduce the contents brieflyaccording to the study by Ｍ. Lewin.'"
NEP － ａ Gradual Road to Socialism
　Although Bukharin often stated that the private entrepreneurs in the cities and the coun-
tryside were to be evicted in the long run, he did not see the deepening socialization as ａ
process in which　the evicted private sectors had　to　be replaced by an ever-growing, all-
embracing state. For Bukharin, both the NEP and the market are not tactical retreats but
good strategy for the entire transitional period. He thought that they should reach socialism
by no other ways than through market relations. This meant for him that victory of socialist
economic agencies over private merchants and entrepreneurs, as well as of the socialist CO-
operatives in the countryside over kulak cooperatives had to be achieved in open competition
in the marketplace.
Industrialization and Balanced Growth
　Bukharin, who had proposed merely “accumulation through circulation” theory as a pro-
gramm for industrial development in the industrialization debate in mid 1920゛S，came to admit
in these days the necessity of“pumping” of accumulation funds for industrial development
from agriculture in certain degree. Once the principle of enhanced accumulation at the ex-
pense of peasantry was accepted, it seemed essential to Bukharin to state the ways, methods,
and limits of doing S0. Bukharin attached great importance to the concept of balanced growth,
which was also the spirit of the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927. He underlined
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that it was important not to attain ａ maximum rate of growth for the very next year, but to
attain ａ long-run, high and steady rate of growth, for which today's term “optimal” would
be appropriate｡
　He essentially warned against an overemphasis on heavy industry and stressed the develop-
ment of light industries, which could serve not only as providers of consumer goods but also
as ａ good sources of accumulation　for　the benefit of further growth. In addition, he en-
couraged　small　industries　and　the traditional handicrafts (kustarinichestvo) as convenient
sources of supplies capable of mitigating shortages arising during a period of industrial ex-
pansion when resources　became tied　up　in factory　construction. At ａ party meeting in
1928 Bukharin underlined his acceptance of preferential treatment of heavy industry and of
ambitious growth targets, but at the same time considering that upper limits had already been
reached, he opposed to overzealous raising of growth rate － “tempopathology” － and over-
investment in heavy industry｡
　In the light of Bukharin's logic　as　such, more essential cause of the procurement crisis
behind the erroneous price policy seemed to consist in the unbalanced development of industry.
In any　case, Bukharin warned　that the unbalanced development of industry would lead to
ａ catastrophic result.
Planning and Market
　Bukharin believed in the superiority of planning but did not think, as propaganda argued,
that ａ planned economy ｗａｓtｂsｏｆａｃtｏsuperior to the unplanned （ｏrless planned) economy.
He called the quality　of ａ plan ・and　the way　of performance of ａ plan into account. He
often emphasized　the limitations of ａ well-reasoned plan and the deterious　results of an ill-
conceived one, and warned　that damages and chaos caused by incompetant but powerful
planners could cause havoc･ worse than the unplanned spontaneity of capitalism. He criticized
a ludicrous plan which allowed for a discrepancy between targets and resources, for example,
like the current “control figures” which predicted therefore, in ａ sense, planned - ａ
２０percent gap between the building targets and the production of necessary iron. It was
self-evident to him : “One does not build today's factories with future bricks.”And he em-
phasized that coordination among the various branches of the economy and the internal CO-
herence of ａ plan were necessary to bring about the goals of the programm. Still,even when
the plan possessed internal consistency on paper, such consistency was lacking in the process
of its implementation. Market forces and relations as well as other spontaneous factors outside
economics, which could not be eliminated at this stage, made an ideal. imperative plan itn-
possible. Thus it became necessary that ａ plan, if it were to be effective, should be con-
nected with market relevantly.
Planning and State
　Bukharin's more cautious attitude to the possibilities of planning stemmed from the fear
that overambitious plan　might･result　in　oppressing　too many and suppressing too much.
According to him. Russia's “small people” 一一 the craftsmen, small merchant, small indus-
trialists, and small agricultural producers 一一 as well as cooperative and governmental small
scale enterprises and services, were not only indispensable but also complementary to in-
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dustrialization, capable of mitigating current and future tensions generated by the investment
effort that was largely directed toward large-scale projects. The neglect, or destruction, 0f
such sectors would　deprive　the state of useful devices and possibilities for economic ma-
neuvering in ａ period of strain, and, instead, would lead to the exacerbation of conflicts
and　crisis. The　premature　elimination　ｏｆ“the　small　people。and their replacement by
“chinovnik” would beget ａ swollen, costly, and ineffecient apparatus, and this, in turn, set
in motion its own, self-sustaining dynamism. Thinking like this, he emphasized “the reduc-
tion of state to minimum”.5）
　Instead, in Bukharin's eyes, the party leadership was embarking in 1928 0n a course that
could not be implemented without mass terror. Bukharin, who thought that predominantly
oppressive　administrative methods could　only lead to the creation of an ｏｂｆｒｒｅｓｓiｘjeｖstｅｍ，
accused the leadership of installing a system of military feudal exploitation of the peasantry.
Against an creeping “Leviathan”， he proposed to achieve the “commune state”and stressed
the necessity of less centralization, more party democracy, more rationality and scientific
approach to problems, no mass coercion, less reliance on strictly administrative state mea-
sures, priority to gradualism and persuasion.　　　　　　　　　　　.
IV. The First Five-Year Plan
　The first five-year plan was to start from October 1928 and end　in September　1933,　1t
was the Sixteenth Party Conference in April 1929 that formally adopted the plan. Until the
formal adoption, there were many turns and twists.“In the meanwhile, Ｇ。splan endeavour-
ed to do its best in the circumstances, and to produce ａ plan which was based on　sound
technical and economic　calculations. However, the criteria and　the assumption on which
Goｓｂｌａｎｖiaｓworking were constantly being distorted by external pressures. There was one
thing on which　the Politburo insisted, and　which　in practice took priority over a11 other
considerations; this was　the question　ｏｆ‘growth rates'. In their view, the best plan was
the 'tightest' one, the one that achieved most in the least time.”6）Ｔｈｅ planners, who were
aware of the risks involved in resisting the pressures from the Politburo, remarked in the
privacy of their own offices that it was better “to comply with the demand for rapid growth
than to go to prison for having advocated more moderate ones”ノ）
　In ａ power struggle at the Politburo level, the Bukharinists were defeated and almost de-
prived of real power before the Party Conference. Many non-Bolsheviki economists as well
as Bolsheviki　economists　were eliminated　from　Ｇｏｓ＆Ｉａｎalong　with　the defeat of the Bu-
kharinists. Thus the drafts of the first five-year plan were presented to the party leadership
at length｡
　The concrete task of the plan was socialist industrialization and socialist reorganization of
agriculture. Out　of　the　two　variants　i.e., minimum (standard) variant and maximum
(optimal) variant which　were prepared for　the plan, the maximum variant was adopted.
Maximum variant was very ambitious as was shown in the growth rate. Maximum variant
aimed to attain within five years what minimum variant predetermined to attain in six years.
Maximum variant depended on relatively optimistic forecast. as compared with minimum
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variant, in respects of the agricultural development, the connection with the world economy,
the attainment of qualitative targets (labour productivity, harvest rate, etc.) and the size
of defence expenditure which related with international situations.
　Maximum variant was more ambitious than Trotskyte super industrialization which Stalin
himself had criticized before. As compared with 11 1 billion rubles which was invested in
the socialist sector during the previous five years, the plan predetermined to invest as much
as 46.2 billion rubles during the five years from October 1928 to September 1933. The plan
predetermined to invest 19.1 billion rubles in industry including 14.7 rubles (77 percent of
allindustry) in heavy industry and 4.4 billion rubles （23 percent of all industry) in light
industry. Obviously the plan aimed at industrialization with priority to heavy industry. As
for the others. the plan predetermined to invest 7.2 billion rubles in agriculture, 9.9 billion
rubles in transport and 0.3 billion rubles in communication.　　　　　　　　　　。
　In order to enable the industrialization with priority to heavy industry, considerably high
accumulation　rate　was　predetermined, moreover, the　accumulation rate was to be raised
gradually from 22.6 percent in the first year t0 33.6 percent in the last year. But we must
not overlook that　also　the absolute　volume of consumption　funds　were simultaneously pre-
determined to increase year after year　in this plan (See Table 1). As to the security of
labour power necessary for industrialization. the problem was optimistically considered. taking
into account the existence of potential overpopulation in the countryside (estimated about 8.５
million in the beginning of the firstfive-year plan) other than unemployees (about 1.１ million)｡
　　　　　　　　　Table 1. Maximum Variant (in billion rubles at current prices)
1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 For the
five year
1. National income
2. Non･productive con-
　　sumption
　　In % of col. 1.
3. Accumulation in
　　both fixed and work-　　ing capital*
　　In % of col. 1.
24.7
20.0
80.1
　4.66
18.9
27.5
21.3
77.4
　6.22
22.6
30.9
22.2
71.8
　8.71
28.2
34.8
23.6
67.9
11.18
32.1
38.7
25.8
66.8
12.85
33.2
43.3
28.8
66.4
14.54
33.6
175.2
121.7
69.5
53.54
30.5
＊　except amortization
Source : Maurice Dobb， ＳｏＴｕietＥｃｏｉｉｏ。ｌｉｅＤ ・ｅｌｏｐｍｅｎtＳｉｎｃｅ１９１７, Ｒｅvised, Enlarged
　　　　　Edition, New York ； International Publishers,
｡1966,
p. 236.
　However, this plan was of eclectic character at the same time. We must pay regard to
socialist reorganization of agriculture, which was predetermined to be carried out in prudent
and moderate pace, for example, 15 percent of the collectivization rate estimated for the last
year. Therefore,“The five year plan itself did not deviate from the conception that the
construction of socialism　in　the USSR should　be　carried forward within the framework of
NEP, stillless did not suppose that NEP might be abandoned”.8゛
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Ｖ。“Great Turn”
　In practice. the five-year plan was not carried out as what it was. The prerequisites (i.e.,
the forecast), on which maximum variant depended, were broken as soon as the plan was
formally adopted. For example, in July　10, 1929 an incident happened that the Chinese
authorities took over the east China railway by force. This incident was settled with much
difficulties at the end of this year. After that, the invasion of Manchurian by Japanese
militarism, which happened in 1931, also constituted a grave menace to the safety of the
USSR, These incidents urged to reexamine the five-year plan from the viewpoint of further
development of heavy industry which had a close relationship with the defence power. In
addition, world crisis began in October, 1929, and the terms of trade in the world market
became unfavourable to the USSR｡
　But it is internal factors, especially agricultural problem rather than the above-mentioned
international factors that ｅχerted significant influences on　the. performance of the plan. In
1929 agricultural production was lower than the previous year, and procurement crisis still
continued. In November in this year Bukharin was released from the membership of the
Politburo, and Rykov (chairman of the Council ０ｆPeople's Commissars) and Tomsky (chair-
man of the General Council of All-USSR Trade Unions) both were Politburo Member一一一一
were　given　ａ　severe　warning. Bukharinists　suffered　け1e final defeat in the　intra-party
struggle. Thus in the end of the year 1929 Stalin, who found no political obstacle, suddenly
made ａ“great turn”, that is, a drastic　turn　from“the restriction of kulak” policy to an
overall collectivization of agriculture together with “the liquidation of kulak as class”policy.
F. Engels's well-known proposition, which stressed the respect of the spontaneousness of pea-
santry in case of socialist reorganization of agriculture, was declared ｎ０longer invalid｡
　Rapid collectivization itself required　acceleration of　industrialization because it was nee-
essary to supply ａ large quantity　of agricりltural machines to countryside in order to carry
forward socialist reorganization of agriculture. The economic year were made t６correspond
with the calendar year since 1930. In connection with such ａ circumstance, the first five-
year plan was rearranged to be completed by the end of the year　1932. The so-called
socialist competition　were encouraged on　ａ　nationwide scale　with a slogan “the five-year
plan in four years F≒and industrialization was accelerated further. The main characteristic
which was perceived in Stalin's guidance of economy was voluntarism. He guided it as if
the will 0f omnipotent planning organ　could　control the objective process at its disposal.
Targets were frequently modified during the five-year plan. And it was made desirable that
everyone should overattain the targets. Total investment during four years and three months
amounted, in practice, to 24.8　billion rｕ!bles　against 19.1　bil!ion rubles estimated for five
years in the plan. Especially, total investment in heavy industry amounted t0 21.3 billion
rubles against 14.7 billion rubles. ０ｎ the other hand, total investment in light industry was
only 3.5 billion rubles against 4.4 billion rubles. As we have seen, much more priority was
given to heavy industry than predetermined by the plan｡
　Ａ view, the most influential among western researchers, may be true. That iS; the indus-
trialization　with　priority　to heavy　industry during　the first five-year plan was, in fact,
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those, which Stalin translated into practice, adopting the leftist line of accelerated indus-
trialization based on Preobrazhensky's “socialist primitive accumulation”.=" Soviet researchers
would not accept such ａ view. But it is difficult　todeny this western view when we ex-
amine how such ａ rapid accumulation became possible and trace sources for the accumulation
of industrialization. The state budgetary system fully functioned in the industrialization pro-
cess. To point out an outline, profits created in socialist sectors were pumped up mainly
through ･two channels, i.e., taxes from trades and deductions from profits, and similarly
funds of the populations (most of them were, ０ｆcourse, peasantry) through the industriali-
Table 2. The Balance of Material Exchange between Agriculture and
　　Ｎｏｎ･agriculturalSphere in Social Sectors
　　　(in million rubles at calculationprices*)
All
agriculture Sovkhozy
Kolkhoz-cooperativesector
Private
sector
Socializedeconomy Subsidiary
work of
kolkhozpeasantryKolkhozyand MTS
　Soc. eco.
of kolkhozy
　1930
1. Marketed output of
　agriculture
2. Industrial goods de-
　Iivered to agriculture
3. Balance (2-1)
4. Equivalent coefficient
　(1:2)
　1931
1. Marketed output of
　agriculture
2. Industrial goods de-
　livered to agriculture
3. Balance (2-1) .
4. Equivalent coefficient
　（1:2）
　1932
1. Marketed output of
　agriculture
2. Industrial goods de･
　livered to agriculture
3. Balance (2-1)
4. Equivalent coefficient
　（1:2）
　1938
1. Marketed output of
　agriculture
2. Industrial goods de-
　livered to agriculture
3. Balance (2-1)
4. Equivalent coefficient
　（1:2）
　4,814.7
　2,357.7
-2,457.0
　　　　2.04
　4,882.4
　2,106.6
-2,775.8
　　　　2.31
　3,780.5
　1,949.9
-1,830.6
　　　　1.94
　3,529.7
　2,152.4
-1,377.3
　　　　1.64
　250.4
　300.4
　十50.0
　　0.82
　253､9
　461.3
十207.4
　　0.55
　211.7
　415.3
十203.6
　　0.51
　478.3
　248.6
-229.7
　　1.92
　1,189.1
　　281.9
　－907.2
　　　　4.22
　2,187.3
　　490.2
-1,697.1
　　　　4.46
　1,977.2
　　702.0
-1,275.2
　　　　2.82
　1,992.5
　1,045.8
　-946.7
　　　　1.37
　1,189.1
　　　250.2
　-938.9
　　　　4.75
　2,187.3
　　　282.3
－1,905.0
　　　　7.75
　1,977.2
　　　426.5
-1,550.7
　　　　4.64
　1,992.5
　　　627.7
-1,364.8
　　　　3.17
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
　－
1,058.9
　858.1
－200.8
　　1.23
　3,375.2
　1,775.6
-1,599.6
　　　1.90
　2,441.2
　1,551.1
-Ij286. 1
　　　2.11
　1,501.6
　　832.6
　-759.0
　　　1.91
　　－
　　－
　　－
　　－
* The prices which are converted close to the values
Source: Ａ. A. Barsov,“NEP ｉ Vyravnivanie Ekonomicheskikh Otnoshenii mezhdu Gorodom
　　　　　i Derevnei"，Ｍ. Ｐ. Kim (ed. )， Ｎｏｕａｙａ Ｅｋ。ｎ。ｍｉｃｈｅｓka:ｙａ　Ｐｏｉｉｔika： Ｖｏｉ＞ｒｏりＴｅｏｒii
　　　　　i Iｓtｏｒii,Moscow : Nauka, 1974, p. 101.
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zation bonds and taxes, to the state budget, and hence these funds were distributed prepon-
derantly to heavy industry.
　However, we cannot obtain enough information on the extent of the agriculture's burden
in industrialization, only from the materials concerning the state budget. ０ｎ this point the
most noteworthy is the study by ａ Soviet economist Ａ. A. Barsov."" Barsov drew up the
balance of material exchange between rural　and urban regions in terms of value, and he
made it clear that agriculture redistributed considerably huge amount of surplus products to
other branches during the first five-year plan. Besides, he admitted that the redistribution
of agricultural surplus products to other branches was done through non-equivalent exchange.
For example, the equivalent coefficient　of　exchange in　193! equals 2.31, and this means
that　agriculture　delivered 2.31 units　of agricultural products to the other branches in ex-
change for　every　l unit　of　product from　the other branches during this year. And, 69
percent of　the funds, which　were　devoted to industrialization, came from rural regions in
1928. From the above-mentioned facts, we can understand that the rapid industrialization
during these years was, in fact, carried out at considerable sacrifices of the peasantry (how-
ever, Barsov does not Say“sacrifice”, but “great contribution by peasantry to industriali-
zation”.). That is why we want to call the process “socialist primitive accumulation”.
　However, it is inaccurate to say that only peasantry made considerable sacrifices during
these years. Not only peasantry but also workers made considerable sacrifices. Western
researchers, for example, N. Jasny have underlined this point since early timeS.11）ln recent
years similar opinions began to appear also in the USSR. For example, Roy Medvedev says :
　　　　　　　　Table 3. The Utilized National Income in 1928-1932　（ａt 1928 prices)
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
1. National income (million rubles)
　　Volume index (year 1928＝100）
　　Volume index (previous year = 100)
2. Consumption funds (million rubles)
　　proportion of consumption funds in na･
　　　tional income （％）
　　Volume index (year 1928 = 100)
　　Volume index (previous year = 100)
　　　including :
　　　　industrial outputs & constructions
　　　　　(million rubles)
　　　　agricultural products (million rubles)
3. Accumulation funds (million rubles)*
　　proportion of accumulation funds in na-
　　　tional income （％）
　　Volume index (year 1928 = 100)
　　Votume index (previous year = 100)
　　　including:
　　　　industrial outputs　＆　constructions
　　　　　(mil】ion rubles)
　　　　agricultural products (million rubles)
25,003.1
　　100.0
　　　　－
21,305.7
　　　85.7
　　100.0
　　　　－
14,951.6
　6,354.1
　3,697.4
　　14.3
　　100.0
　　　－
　2,503.9
1,193.5
27,376.5
　　110.5
　　110.5
22,575.2
　　82.2
　　106.0
　　106.0
15,886.4
　6,688.8
　4,801.3
　　17.8
　　130.0
　　130.0
4,653.5
　　147.5
32,407.5
　　131.4
　　118.9
23,177.2
　　70.9
　　108.9
　　102.7
16,814.9
　6,362.3
　9,230.3
　　29.1
　　249.6
　　192.0
　9,010.5
　　219.8
36,374.0
　　146.5
　　111.4
22,705.2
　　　60.2
　　106.6
　　　98.0
16,533.8
　6,171.4
13,668.8
　　　39.8
　　369.6
　　148.0
13,324.7
　　344.1
40,100.0
　　162.2
　　-110.2
22,375.8
　　　55.8
　　105.0
　　　98.5
16,916.9
　5,458.9
17,724.2
　　　44.2
　　479.3
　　129.7
17,462.6
　　261.6
* except amortization
Source： Ａ． A. Barsov，　Ｂａｌａｎｓ Ｓｔｏｔｍｏｓtn3ife!iＯｂｍｅｎｉｙｕｍｅｚhdｕ Ｇｏｒｏｄｏｍ.i E)ｅｒｃｖｎｅｉ.Moscow
　　　　　Nauka, 1969, pp. 90-91.
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“Beginning in 1931, price indices for food and manufactured goods were no longer published.
But the drop in the volume of consumption of these products shows that the decline in real
wages continued in 1931-32.”12j
　Barsov's study also endorsed such a view. Almost all of the researches in the USSR there-
tofore simply maintained that industrialization was accompanied by the increase in the con-
sumption funds of the population, in disregard of the rise in prices during these years."'
On the contrary, Barsov converted the utilized national income in 1928-32 （ａt current prices)
into those of the ｡1928 prices, and drew up ａ new table which eliminated the factors of price
fluctuations Table 3　shows this. From　this table　we can perceive the following points :
First, the accumulation rate was rising year after year, and rose sharply especially after 1930,
that is, 29.1 percent in 1930, 39.8 percent in 1931 and at an exorbitantly high rate of 44 2
percent in 1932. Second, it is natural that consumption funds were decreasing relatively,
but moreover, consumption funds, culminating to a peak in 1930, turned and decreased ab-
solutely.　In addition, Barsov reports ａ fact that the volume of consumption in agricultural
products in 1932 was 27.5 percent below per capita in urban regions and 28.1 percent below
per capita in rural regions compared with the volume inl928.i幻　Working class in the USSR
strived for industrialization at their own heroic sacrifices.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　Ⅵ. The Results of the Performance of the Plan
　What were the results of the industrialization, which had been created at such ａ heavy
cost ？　To begin with, let us quote ａ number of statistics which were published by the USSR.
Industrial outputs increased by 124 percent, and the target was attained 97.3 percent in four
years and three months Above all, heavy industry increased by 173 percent, and the target
was attained 108 percent during　this period. ０ｎ the other hand, growth in light industry
was only 56 percent, and the target could not be attained. As ａ result of the industrializa-
tion, the percentage of domestic products in the whole supply of equipments and tool-making
machine increased. Agricultural production　was to grow one and half times in five years
according to the plan. But, because of disorder (resistances by peasantry and mass slaughter
of livestocks) in the process of collectivization of agriculture other than poor harvest in 1931
and 1932, not only the targets for agriculture could not be attained but also the agricultural
production decreased. The collectivization was carried out with more rapid pace than plan-
ned. As ａ result, out of gross agricultural products. the proportion of agricultural products
produced in　socialist sector　reached　76.1 percent. Since the proportion of sovkhozy and
kolkhozy in the production of marketed grain amounted t0 84 percent, the volume of grain
procurement increased to the 】evel that could somehow support industrialization.“Leasing
of industrial enterprises as a form of state capitalism”15）ＣｅａＳｅｄto exist virtually by 1930.
“Private industry, which had played certain roll in census industry in the beginning of the
introduction of NEP, was virtually driven away completely already in the earliest years ,0f
the firstfive-year plan as ａresult of successful development of socialist (state and cooperative)
industry.”16）Small industry (kustarinichestvo, etc.), in which 57.1 percent of alllabour
power of the Soviet industry had been engaged and which had produced 22.4 percent of the
gross industrial output in 1926/27, was　rapidly losing importance.''" The　private sector.
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　99.5
　76.1
100
　93
　61.5
　84
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which had occupied　17.6 percent of the gross industrial output in 1928, occupied only 0.５
percent in　1932.1" Out of gross national income, the proportion of national income which.
was created in socialist sector rose　t０９３percent in 1932.. The socialist sector completely
dominated also in the sphere of circulation. (See Table ４.）
Table 4. The Results of the Performance of the First Five･Year Plan
I. Socialist Industrialization
　　　Industrial output (the first year = 100)
Ⅱ. Socialization
　　　Proportion of socialist sector （％）
　　　　　Industrial production
　　　　　Agricultural production
　　　　　Retail turnover
　　　　　National income
　　　Rate of collectivization
　　　　　　　（interms of household)
Propotion of sovkhozy and kolkhozy
　　in marketed grain
Ⅲ. Economic Self-Reliance
　　　Proportion of domestic products in
　　　　　　whole supply
　　　　Equipments
　　　　Ｔｏｏｌ･makingmachines
100
79.5
　1.8
75
44
　1.7
　7.5
67.5
33
230
92.4
14.7
91
66.3
20
42.6
一
一
Source: Ｖ. I. Eidel'man (ed.). ＳｈａｇｉＰ:ｙａtiletolこ,Moscow･, 1968, p. 73.
　How shall we understand these statistics now ？　As is generally known, western economists
have discussed the methods of estimation of“correct” numerical value, for the reason that
Soviet industrial statisticsinclude overestimates （bｙ duplicated･ calculation of interim products, ・
neglect of rise in prices and so on). The author has no intention to go into this problem here.
But the author wants to introduce only one distorted view. An ex-Mensheviki and Russian
emigre N. Jasny maintained in his last book that the industrialization effort during these
years was accompaniec! by the pursuit for　qualitative targets at　the　expense of qualitative
targets and many disorganization, and that not so many results could be obtained. He told us
that the effort was in vain."' On the contrary。an English economist Ｒ. W. Davies properly
criticized　Jasny's view in his review article. According to Davies, Jasny was not free from
bias,so that“the achievements resulting from　the capital construction drive of 1928-32 are
unrecorded, and it is made to seem an entirely pointless exercise”20) in his description. We
also need to study Davies' attitude in which he tries to observe the realities with ａ cool mind｡
　Indeed, the industrialization during these years was accompanied by enormous wastes of
resources and labour powers from dispersed investment and disorganization. But an objective
fact remains that approximately 1,500 big enterprises were built, including Dneproges, the
Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical complexes. the Ural machine factory, the Rostov
agricultural-machinery plant. tractor factories at CheliabinskレStalingrad, and Kharkov, auto-
mobile factories in Moscow and Sormovo, the Ural chemical works, the Kramator factory of
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heavy machinery, etc..　And new sectors of industry were established, which had not existed
in tsarist Russia一automobile and tractor manufacturing, a chemical industry, etc.."'　At
that time. capitalist countries suffered from world crisis which began in 1929 and extended
to an unprecedented scale. In these countries productions declined　sharply　and　ａ　great
number of unemployees surfaced. It　stands out　in　striking contrast to　the stagnation of
capitalist countries that only　the USSR, at the same time, wrestled with large scale con-
struction of industry and made ａ great progress without “business cycles”, suffering from
labour shortage rather than unemployment. It is without question that heavy industry which
had been constructed during these years led to the reinforcement of defence power and further
contributed the victory of the USSR in World War II｡
　Is it right that we should consider the construction of socialism in the USSR from this one
point ？　It seems that many-faceted considerations are required. How should we consider
the following problems: the stagnation of light industry, the decline of agricultural produc-
tions, the enforcement of collectivization of agriculture and so on ？　Researchers, especially
Marxists in Japan hitherto have positively evaluated the construction of socialism in the USSR
during these years, considering these problems as inevitable consequences of the construction
of heavy industry. The author also was not an ｅχception. However, it seems that the tradi-
tional evaluation is too optimisticニ
　　　　　　　　　　　ⅦExaminations of “the Inevitability of the Turn”
　Here we encounter ａ problem that should be examined. This is the problem: “the inevi-
tability　of　turn”at　the　end　of 1929. , This also relates　to　the problem :　how should we
evaluate Ｎ. Bukharin. There are some arguments which justify “the great turn” by Stalin
at the end of 1929 for the following reasons. The author can not afford to examine these
reasons from every side. So, the author will confine himself to write brief comments on the
reasons, promising to discuss them in detail afterwards.
a) The international situations
　Soviet researchers explain that the enforcement of the overall collectivization of agriculture
from above was done because of serious international situations at that time. But Ｍ. Lewin
explains that the leadership of CPSU took into no account the factor of international situations
when they enforced the overall collectivization of agriculture from above. To mention inter-
national situations as ａ reason .is, according to Lewin, a justification by hindsight｡"' Also
it is well-known to us now　that CPSU was not very cautious against the　rising　Nazis　in
Germany until 1934. Thus, Lewin's argument seems to be well-ground. A further examina-
tion will be required on this point.
b）Ｔｈｅ Growth of Kulaks
　An argument is widespread that kulaks, who had grown up by this time, were reluctant to
sell grain, and therefore changed into an obstacle for industrialization. But, on the contrary,
we may be allowed to say that an error in price policy became one of the causes of the pro-
curement crisis.・For example, the state procurement price of grain was fixed at ａ low level,
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and a gap between the procurement price and the private market price was widening （75
percent in 1927/28, 134 percent in 1928/29)."' And that, rich peasants in the USSR were
relativelysmall by the criteriaof Western Europe. It seems doubtful to emphasize the menace
of the restorationof capitalism directlyfrom the existences of kulaks.
c) The Problem of Replacement of Fixed Capital
　Professor Kamijima (Osaka College of Economics, Japan), for example, states:“Grain pro-
curement crisis was not mere shortage of procurement, nor mere crisis in countryside (the
rise of kulaks), but it was, in fact, ａ consequence of synthetic synergy of contradictions
inherent in NEP.”24）Ｈｅ attaches　the importance to　the replacement of fixed capital, as
follows : “At this point of time, at last. state industry　was entering a period of full-scale
construction, and this induced demands for new investment, firstof all, in wide sphere of
heavy industry. Therefore, neither to follow former method of accumulation, nor to preserve
moderate　growth　rate, in　actualities, became　almost　possible　physically.　Neither　the
shortage of procurement and the corresponding raise of procurement price, nor the reduction
in prices of manufactured goods - tolerable in the past ―- were ｎ０longer possible econo-
mically and physically.”25J　Professor Kamijima asserts that NEP was in an impasse at that
time and that it became inevitable to turn to ａ new policy beyond the framework of NEP.
So, he does not agree with Roy Medvedev's opinion that though still effective, NEP was
abolished before the time Ｓｅt.26）（Ｈｏｗｅｖｅr，ｈｅdoes not forget to add : This turn was done
by Stalin in the most clumsy way.)
　It is sure that NEP got into ａ serious difficulty at that time. But in what degree was the
“turn” inevitable ？　Didn't he overestimate the problem ･of replacement of fixed capital ？　On
this point, an American economist　Ｄ. Granick, who had studied Soviet metal-fabricating
industry in detail, argued that the fear of ａ replacement bulge, which a delay of the re-
placement of fixed capital might intensify, had been grossly exaggerated."'
d)Ｔｈｅ Construction of Heavy Industry the Reinforcement of the Defence Power
　It is often said that the industrialization with priority to heavy industry under the leader-
ship of Stalin somehow created heavy industry and reinforced the defence power, which in
turn led the USSR to victory in World War II, whereas Bukharin's course might not have
created heavy industry and, consequently, not led to victory.　But such an argument is
quite doubtful. Indeed some merits were involved in Stalin's course, but much more demerits
were involved too. Bukharin opposed Stalin for the reason that Stalin's policy would invite
an catastrophic result, and failed from power in　1929. When we reexamined the results of
the performance of the first five-year plan with　ａ cool mind, we could say that Bukharin's
anxiety and forecast unfortunately proved true. It is sure that heavy industry took ａ leap
forward owing to the performance of the plan, but light industry showed stagnation and agri-
cultural production inversely declined. As to heavy industry, notwithstanding the great in-
vestment with considerable sacrifices, the result corresponding to the sacrifices could not be
obtained｡
　A. A. Barsov　points out　the　bad influence　which extraordinarily high investment rate
exerts on industrial development, that iS: in spite of the yearly rise in the accumulation rate
The Construction of Socialism in the USSR during the First Five･Year Plan 71
during the first five-year plan, growth rate of national income was adversely decreasing year
after year, and especially in 1933, when industrial output increased by only ５ percent. com-
pared t0 1932 when the accumulation rate boomed t0 44.2 percent. According to Barsov,
the shortage of the consumption goods, which intensified in 1931 and　1932, was negatively
reflected in the material interest of the working people, and this could not help to exert in-
fluence on the efficiency of production.^'' Moreover, Barsov explained without mentioning
the name of Bukharin : “We can not help supposing that the accumulation rates in 1931 and
1932 were, in all probability, extremely too high and scarcely corresponded the optimum con-
dition for　the task of　the most speedy industrialization of　the country when　we take　into
account, first of all, the decline of agricultural production level. It seems　that　the　ap-
proximately same effect in increasing industrial output and growth of heavy industry could
have been obtained, even if somewhat small part of national income was assigned to accu-
mulation, increasing consumption funds and creating better condition for material stimulation
and rise in social labour ｐrodｕｃtiｖitｙ.29）
　Similarly Roy Medvedev says: “The years 1932 and 1933 were ａ time of crisis for the
national economy. Agricultural production had reached its lowest point, famine was begin-
ning in many rural areas, and the industrial working class had also suffered ａ sharp deteriora-
tion in its standard of living.”3o）
　For this reason, the party and the government were obliged to adopt ａ sort of adjustment
policy from 1933 t0 1934. That　is why the second five-year plan, which was adopted　by
t‘he17th Party Congress in January 1934, predetermined that the average growth rate of light
industry should be 18.5 percent while that of heavy industry should be 14.5 percent （Ｈｏｗ-
ever, these　targets　were　neglected　later. ). Consequently　there are　no grounds　for　the
argument that　heavy　industry　would　not　be constructed timely　if Bukharin's course was
adopted. Therefore, the author has ａ fundamental doubt about“the inevitability of turn”.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　VⅢThe Consequences of “Great Turn”
　In fact, Stalin's course　could　not realize　ａ more rapid industrialization than Bukharin's
course even against Stalin's will because of its inherent contradictions. Moreover, Stalin's
course, that iS，“the great turn”，the investment excessively inclined to heavy industry and
the enforcement of collectivization of agriculture from above, created a lack of solidarity and
led toａ social crisis. Thus the regime of suppression became firmly fixed in Soviet socialism.
　In the 192O's neither the single value system, nor the single doctrine dominated society,
and diversified value systems coexisted. Cooperations between the Party and various groups
of intelligentsias and specialists as well as lively debates among people including both party
members and non-party members could be observed everywhere at that time.
　But the process of the execution of Stalin's course after 1928 was simultaneously ａ process
in which different opinions and resistences 一一which naturally occurred -一一 were not settled
through debates and persuasions, but were excluded coercively. Non-Bolsheviki specialists
were made victims of, to begin with, the Shakhty trial (May 1928), the trial of Industrial
Party (November to December 1930), the Mensheviki trial (March 1931) and the trial of
Vickers engineers (April 1933)."' With the Kirov affair (December 1934) as a start, the
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same process proceeded　even within
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7 percent (in terms oりown area) in 1932リ㈲t9 99.1 perceりりp !937. In this conr!ectiqn.
iOリqrｍ叫y explained thg!t spcialism had 副r!邸りriumph and conse叫ently the transitipnal
period from capitalism to§叫叫sm had terminated (“socialism aリhp nr§t phase pf pommunism
h^ji been basical!y realisedつin the ySSR at this ppint ｏりlr限　f9r r哨印りhat socialist
ownership had been completed in nearly 100 percent of the natiqnal economy including
agriculture　And there are many researchers on socialist economy who believe and repeat
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sufficient industrialization. On the contrary, the collectivizatior! of agriculture was, ir! pracr
tice, carried out in an extremely short time, because the leadership of the Party regarded
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it as most important　to　solve　the procurement crisis in order to promote industrialization
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of livestocks was so severe that the 1929 ppak of total hprseppwer utilized on the farms was
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not regained by 1938."' We previously saw that agriculture was utilized as ａ source of
accumulation for industrialization. Now look again Table ４ which Barsov drew up. In 1931,
for example, the equivalent coeffiGient of ex.change bβtween agriculture and non-agricultural
sphere equals 2.31. From the items of the same table, we can perceive that the equivalent
coefficient of exchange between socializec!economy of kolkhpzy 即皿 non-agricultural sphere
equals 7.75 (this means that socialized economy of kolkhozy delivered 7.75 units of agricultural
products to ｎｏr!-agricultural sphere in exchange for every l unit of product from the !atter).
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Moreover, the balance of material exchange between agrici!lture 即d the state (Table 5), whicl!
also Barsov drew up, shows that the equivalent coefficient of exchange between socialized
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economy of kolkhozy and the state was ａ tremendously high figure of 8.66. State procurement
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prices were pegged at an extremely low level during the 193O's, so that the pripes of many
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Table 5. The Balance of Material Exchange between Agriculture and
　　　　　　theStatein Social Sectorsin 1931
　　　　　　　(ｉｎmillionrubles at calculationprices)
All
agriculture
Sovkhozy
Kolkhoz･cooperative
sector Private*
sector
Kolkhozyand MTS 　soc.
eco.
of kolkhozy
1.?Vlarketed output of agriculture
　　　delivered to the state
2. Industrial goods delivered from
　　　the state to agriculture
3. Balance (2-1)
4. Equivalent coefficient（1:2）
　4,320.9
　1,313.0
-3,007.9
　　　3.29
　253.9
　424.5
十170.6
　　　0.59
　2,178.3
　　　420.5
-1,766.8
　　　　5.15
　2,178.3
　　　249.9
-1,937.4
　　　　8.66
　1,879.5
　　　468.0
-1,411.5
　　　　3.96
* Private sector includes subsidiary work of kolkhoz peasantry in this table.
Source: Ａ. A. Barsov,　Ｂａｌａｎｓ Ｓtｏｉｍｏｓtｎｙkh　Obｖｉｅｎｏｖｍｅｚｈｄｕ Ｇｏｒｏｄｏｍｉ Ｄｅｒｅｕｎｅｉ，
　　　　　　Moscow : Nauka, 1969. pp. 148-149.
ture socialistic？
　The construction of socialism after“the great turn” not only transformed ａ backward ag-
ricultural country into ａ industrial country,･ but also fundamentally remolded the Soviet society
as well as the Communist Party of Soviet Union itself. The author can not characterize this
metamorphosis appropriately;　According to Ｍ. Lewin's formulation, the Stalin model that
emerged in the 193O's on the ruins of NEP exhibited the following traits:34’
　1）a high degree of centralization of economic decision making and planning
　2) comprehensive character of planning　　　　　　　｀
　3) preference for physical units as instruments in accounting
　4) the use of “material balances” for obtaining internal consistency of the plans
　5）ａ centralized administration for material supplies, which operated as ａ rationing system
　6) the imperative and detailed character of plans
　7）a hierarchically organized administration within factories
　8) the relegation of market categories　and　mechanisms to ａ secondary role, mainly the
　　　　　sphere, albeit important, 0f personal consumption and t０labor
　9) coercion by the state. as direct organizer of the economy with its ubiquitous controls
　　　　　and etatization not only of the economy but of the other spheres of life as well
　In addition to that, we can say that the situation such as a fusion, an adhesion, an uni-
fication of the Party and the State, in other words, “etatization of the Party” was completed
in the political sphere."' The Soviet society which had been remolded in the 193O's is an
unique socialism carved out of the above-mentioned traits.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Note
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